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Many a Slip: The Challenge of Impact  
as Boundary Object in Social Finance 
Emily Barman ∗ 
Abstract: »Einige Ausrutscher: Die Herausforderung des Impacts als Grenzobjekt 
in sozialen Finanzleistungen«. This article considers the construction of the mar-
ket of Impact Investing – financial investment with the intentional pursuit of 
“impact” alongside financial return – as one case of the broader turn to Social 
Finance. Impact Investing is championed by proponents for its ability to provide 
a sustainable and scalable market-based solution to societal and environmental 
problems, in contrast to the limited efforts of government and civil society. This 
article delineates the work of the market maker who motivated the construc-
tion of a judgment device to address the issue of quality uncertainty in this 
new market. I offer a genealogy of this rating system for firms as potential im-
pact investments, showing that it was commissioned by proponents of Impact 
Investing who, having first engaged in boundary work to distinguish Impact 
Investing from other spaces of Social Finance, then sought to appeal to tradi-
tional investors by mimicking the calculative tools used in traditional capital 
markets. Yet, the adaptation of a financial rating system to the new field was 
complicated by the multivocal status of “impact” as a boundary object involv-
ing multiple, disparate actors committed to the common project of creating a 
judgement device for impact investment yet diverging on the question of how 
impact was to be created by businesses and for whose benefit. The result was a 
slippage between the conception of impact espoused by the market maker of 
Impact Investing and the type of impact gauged by the rating system itself, 
with likely reactive effects for impact investors and investees. I conclude by 
positing that the development of suitable judgement devices that capture and 
communicate the impact of socially or environmentally oriented financial ac-
tivity is one critical yet understudied condition for the ability of social finance 
markets to achieve their promise. 
Keywords: Judgement devices, boundary work, boundary object, impact invest-
ing, social finance, United States. 
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1. Introduction 
Impact Investing is a new market of Social Finance (Nicholls, Patterson, and 
Emerson 2015; Langley 2018), first emerging in the United States in 2007, 
characterized by investors providing capital with the goal to generate “social 
and environmental impact alongside financial return” (Chiapello and Godefroy 
2017; GIIN 2018a). Impact investments are directed to firms and investment 
funds that solve a social or environmental problem through a company’s posi-
tive business model, via the sale of a socially or environmentally beneficial 
good or service to underserved customers, alongside the production of econom-
ic return to investors (Monitor Institute 2009; J.P. Morgan 2010; Bugg-Levine 
and Emerson 2011). By 2017, US $35.5 billion was invested in this new finan-
cial market (GIIN 2018a). The growth of Impact Investing forms part of the 
broader turn towards Social Finance, defined as the use of financing methods 
for social or environmental purposes, including Social Impact Bonds, Socially 
Responsible Investing, and ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) 
investing, among others.  
Employing a qualitative case study method and relying on the abductive 
analysis of interviews with key actors, primary documents, and media reports 
(Timmermans and Tavory 2012), this article takes as its concern the conditions 
underlying the growth of the market of Impact Investing in the United States. 
As expected by the literature on concerned markets (Callon 2009; Geiger, 
Harrison, Kjellberg, and Mallard 2014), the viability of this new form of Social 
Finance required not just the creation of a distinctive hybridization of finance 
and impact, but also the creation of a socio-material infrastructure that turned 
firms with a positive business model into objects of financial speculation. To 
achieve that end, the proponents of Impact Investing (the Rockefeller Founda-
tion) commissioned an independent evaluator (the B Lab) to construct a judg-
ment device – the Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) – through 
which the “impact” of potential investment opportunities could be assessed, as 
distinct from their financial value. This rating system was intended to encour-
age mainstream investors to participate in Impact Investing by mimicking 
calculative tools employed in mainstream finance.  
Drawing from a pragmatist approach to value (Muniesa 2012), this article 
provides a biography of the rating system as a judgement device. Despite the 
discursive work of proponents of Impact Investing, the classification system 
that was introduced by this rating system rendered invisible the precise type of 
impact – one based around a company’s positive business model – that was 
intended to be distinctive to the field of Impact Investing. Impact investees 
(firms and investment funds) instead were evaluated according to their equita-
ble treatment of stakeholders and the environment, as characterized by the 
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  33 
concept of impact that defined Corporate Social Responsibility, a pre-existing 
and separate field in Social Finance. This article delineates how this slippage 
between the type of impact deemed of value and the type of impact that was 
captured and communicated by this judgment device followed from the multi-
valent status of impact as a “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer 1989; Star 
2010), in that those actors involved in the making of the new market and those 
actors hired as evaluators to construct this new rating system possessed their 
own distinct and contrasting conceptions of impact (how businesses could 
create social or environmental benefit and for whom). While these actors coop-
erated around the production of a judgment device to gauge impact, their vary-
ing understandings of the concept of impact led to a mismatch between what 
was deemed to be of value and what was valued by the rating system, with 
likely reactive effects for impact investors who employ the rating system and 
impact investees who seek to obtain a high rating from it. By tracing out how 
the construction of a market infrastructure for Impact Investing was disrupted 
by the multivocal nature of the concept of impact, this article contributes to a 
growing literature on the conditions for the construction of concerned markets 
for Social Finance (Callon 2009; Doganova and Karnøe 2015; Barman 2016; 
Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). 
2. Constructing Judgement Devices in Concerned Markets 
Impact Investing constitutes one of a number of “concerned” (Geiger et al. 
2014) or “civilizing” (Callon 2009) markets which entwines market methods 
with a social or environmental objective, including clean technology (Doga-
nova and Karnøe 2015), Fair Trade (Reinecke 2010), and carbon trading 
(MacKenzie 2009). The growth of these fields is premised on the claim that the 
efforts of government and philanthropy are not enough to solve the global 
challenges of development but instead require the sustainability and scalability 
of market-based actors and methods (Barman 2016; United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2018). Literature has examined how these new types of mar-
kets may arise, taking a pragmatist approach to the study of concerned markets 
(Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). This literature draws attention to the performa-
tive role of the socio-material infrastructure of a market, particularly the role of 
judgment devices (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Karpik 2010). These calcula-
tive tools facilitate market operation by coordinating actors around a shared 
convention of value and by classifying and ranking market objects according to 
that criterion (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Beckert 2009; Beckert and Musselin 
2013). 
However, with concerned markets such as Impact Investing, the question of 
uncertainty is exacerbated due to the presence of multiple orders of worth, 
beyond economic value (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Antal, Hutter, and 
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Stark 2015). In these settings, members of a field must negotiate the question 
of which of among many qualities to valorize and how e/valuation may occur 
through the construction of an appropriate judgement device/s. Such markets 
lack established precedents and may be cases of experimentation (Callon 
2009). Authors have noted the challenge and complexities of developing a 
judgment device that expands beyond the capture of solely financial value to 
the capture of other types of value (MacKenzie 2009; Hall, Millo, and Barman 
2015; Barman 2016).  
In the case of Impact Investing, the proponents of this new market recog-
nized the need for a judgment device that, via the construction of a suitable 
classificatory system, would reduce uncertainty by creating commensurability 
and so ranking of the non-financial impact of potential investments in firms or 
investment funds. To do so, a “market maker” – a type of actor willing to take 
on the cost of generating the infrastructure of a market (Poon 2009) – commis-
sioned an evaluator to produce such a device by mimicking credit ratings al-
ready present in finance. However, this act of mimicry was complicated by the 
multivocal status of “impact” as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989; 
Star 2010). A “boundary object” is a representational form that possesses “in-
terpretive flexibility”: it is robust enough to allow for a shared identity across 
multiple groups engaged in a common project but it is variously defined and 
employed by those different actors. Critically, via its multivocality (Padgett and 
Ansell 1993), a boundary object allows different groups cooperatively to work 
together on a shared project without actual consensus around the presumed 
goal of such activity. When these communities cooperate around a shared pro-
ject, the shared but indeterminate nature of a boundary object often produces 
deleterious and unintended effects, because each group engages in efforts based 
on their own conception of the term, leading to discrepancies and misalign-
ments. “Each social world has partial jurisdiction over the resources represent-
ed by that object, and mismatches caused by the overlap become problems” 
(Star and Griesemer 1989, 412).  
This article demonstrates and delineates the consequences of the status of 
“impact” as a boundary object in the space of Social Finance. In the multiple 
arenas that compose Social Finance, impact is often employed as a term that 
conveys the non-financial, social, and/or environmental benefit that is produced 
by socially or environmentally oriented market action, such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investing, Social Impact Bonds, micro-
finance, Impact Investing, and the like. The promise of the production of im-
pact is necessary to justify how market-based solutions can be a viable alterna-
tive to government intervention or NGO effort, while still generating financial 
return (Nicholls et al. 2015; Langley 2018). Thus, the concept of impact is 
employed by actors in multiple arenas of Social Finance to bound this new 
space as distinct from a traditional view of the private sector as characterized 
only by rational self-interest. 
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Yet, as other scholars have noted, while impact is a frequently employed 
term in Social Finance, it either is not defined by those who use it or it is sub-
ject to multiple ambiguous and contradictory definitions (Höchstädter and 
Scheck 2015; Barman 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). As a boundary 
object, impact has a different identity in each of the social worlds that it inhab-
its in terms of how and for whom the market can be harnessed for good (Star 
and Griesemer 1989, 409). Yet, while the variegated status of impact has been 
noted, this article is among the first to examine whether and how the status of 
impact as a boundary object – subject to “internal heterogeneity” (Star and 
Griesemer 1989) – affects the project of Social Finance. It employs a relational 
approach (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008) by examining how actors’ interests 
and position in the multiple fields of Social Finance shaped their lines of ac-
tion. This article is able to delineate how the simultaneous employment of the 
concept of impact by multiple actors who participated in the common project 
(or what Star [2010] calls an “information and work requirement”) of produc-
ing a rating system for Impact Investing led to a discrepancy between the defi-
nition of impact intended to characterize the field of Impact Investing and the 
conception of impact that was captured and communicated by the rating system 
as a judgment device. 
2.1 The Case of Impact Investing 
Impact Investing is a relatively new type of market of Social Finance, first 
emerging in 2007, which is characterized by investors providing capital to 
investment funds or firms with the intention of generating social and environ-
mental impact alongside financial return in companies located in developed and 
developing countries that are “double bottom line” in nature. These locally 
owned and operated firms – often called Small or Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
– are posited to produce financial return for investors and generate impact 
through their positive business model via the sale of a socially or environmen-
tally beneficial good or service to underserved customers, such as financial 
services, education, healthcare, clean technology, or affordable housing. These 
companies can generate additional impact by producing entrepreneurship op-
portunities or financial services and/or by providing quality employment for 
individuals otherwise excluded from the market (J.P. Morgan 2010; Bugg-
Levine and Emerson 2011). In 2017, the last year for which data was collected, 
an estimated US $35.5 billion was invested in this market, with those dollars 
distributed evenly between developed markets and emerging markets (GIIN 
2018a).  
Three sets of actors compose the Impact Investing industry: investors, in-
termediaries, and investment opportunities, including individual firms or in-
vestment funds. As with mainstream financial investing, impact investors in-
clude both asset owners and asset managers. Asset owners consist of 
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individuals and institutions (such as clients of private banks, private family 
offices, development finance institutions, community development institutions, 
and charitable foundations) who typically invest using the financial services of 
asset managers, including boutique firms, or mainstream firms that have sepa-
rate offices focused on Impact Investing. Intermediaries in the market of Im-
pact Investing include consulting firms, evaluators, government agencies, 
foundations, and academics, who generate infrastructure and provide consult-
ing and data to participants in the market. Investment opportunities consist of 
both local firms and investment funds (an investment fund is composed of a 
consolidated pool of capital, invested by a fund manager in a portfolio of se-
lected, qualified companies). These firms and investment funds qualify for 
impact investment if they employ or direct investments to businesses that em-
ploy a business model that offers a market-based solution to a social or envi-
ronmental problem (J.P. Morgan 2010; Bugg-Levine and Emerson 2011).  
Impact Investment is a global movement that is taking on distinct formula-
tions at the local level. At the international level, a number of powerful actors 
have advocated for, engaged in, and sponsored the growth of Impact Investing. 
These include the G8 (G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce 2013), the 
OECD (Wilson 2014), and the United Nations (United Nations Development 
Programme 2018), large charitable foundations, including the Clinton Founda-
tion, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
and a growing array of financial firms, such as Black Rock, Goldman Sachs, 
and JP Morgan, which have created units or platforms dedicated to impact 
investment. As the field has matured, national variants of Impact Investing also 
have emerged, as in the cases of France and South Africa, each with its own 
members and local market infrastructure (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017; Unit-
ed Nations Development Programme 2018). 
3. Towards a Market of Impact Investing 
In the United States, the construction of the market of Impact Investing is at-
tributed by many to the actions of the Rockefeller Foundation; the foundation 
has been called the “organizing instrument” (Jackson 2013) and the “architect” 
of this new financial market (Stabile 2010). The Rockefeller Foundation is one 
of the largest charitable foundations in the world with an endowment of $4.1 
billion in 2016 and a mission to “promote the well-being of humanity” (Rocke-
feller Foundation 2018). Over the years, the Rockefeller Foundation has en-
gaged in a number of core initiatives intended to shape the field of international 
development. By the late 1990s, the focus of the Rockefeller Foundation shift-
ed to the problem of global poverty, with an emphasis on strategies to alleviate 
economic inequality in the global South. In 2007, as part of that initiative, the 
Rockefeller Foundation committed to the growth of Impact Investing. The 
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Rockefeller Foundation viewed Impact Investing as an innovative private-
sector solution to social and environmental problems, superior to both the tradi-
tional efforts of government and NGOs. Impact investment would be directed 
to locally-owned and operated firms that produced financial value for investors 
through the generation of profit and generate impact through their business 
model – by selling a socially or environmentally-beneficial good or service that 
was of benefit to disadvantaged customers (Monitor Institute 2009).  
As a case of Social Finance, Impact Investing bore striking parallels to other 
already existing fields in the private sector that also were premised on the claim 
that financial activity could be oriented around economic gain and impact. By 
defining impact as the positive change created by a firm’s business model, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, along with other early advocates, framed Impact In-
vesting as a distinct strategy from those other established views of how markets 
and morals can intersect in the space of Social Finance. Proponents of Impact 
Investing engaged in what Chiapello and Godefroy (2017) have called “bound-
ary-building work.” By engaging in such a definitional project, proponents of 
Impact Investing recognized the nature of “impact” as a boundary object that 
was subject to multiple meanings by different actors in the broader arena of 
Social Finance. 
This effort to demarcate the unique identity of Impact Investing included the 
discursive construction of a boundary between itself and two other fields in the 
arena of Social Finance. First, the Rockefeller Foundation sought to distance 
Impact Investing from Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), a long-standing 
form of investing, begun in the 1970s, that was initially characterized by inves-
tors’ negative screening of firms based on the impact of their products (such as 
the “sin stocks” of alcohol, firearms, and tobacco; J.P. Morgan 2010; Simon 
and Barmeier 2010).1 An early publication on the concept of Impact Investing 
emphasized:  
Impact investors want to move beyond “socially responsible investment,” 
which focuses primarily on avoiding investments in “harmful” companies 
[…]. Instead, they actively seek to place capital in businesses and funds that 
can provide solutions at a scale that purely philanthropic interventions usually 
cannot reach. (Monitor Institute 2009, 5) 
Advocates of Impact Investing also emphasized its difference from Corporate 
Social Responsibility, a field in which companies are held to account by inves-
tors and/or consumers for the effects of their business operations (how firms 
source, produce, and distribute their products) on the environment and stake-
holders (which consist of workers, communities, and customers). Rather than 
 
1  It is critical to note that the distinction made between Socially Responsible Investing and 
Corporate Social Responsibility by early proponents of Impact Investing omitted the grow-
ing overlap between the two fields as socially responsible investments increasingly em-
ployed CSR criteria (Barman 2016). 
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be concerned with what companies produce, CSR pays attention to the effects 
on constituencies of how companies produce those goods (Carroll 1991). 
Emerging in the 1980s, Corporate Social Responsibility constituted a critique 
of multinational corporations’ prioritization of shareholders at the expense of 
the environment and their stakeholders in a globalizing economy. Revealingly, 
of the early publications outlining the concept of Impact Investing (Bugg-
Levine 2009; Monitor Institute 2009; J.P. Morgan 2010; Simon and Barmeier 
2010), none mention companies’ responsibilities to their stakeholders as a 
characteristic of Impact Investing. Three of the five publications reference 
Corporate Social Responsibility, but only to distinguish the project of Impact 
Investing from that of CSR (Bugg-Levine 2009; Monitor Institute 2009). In an 
outline of the project of Impact Investing, for example, the authors conclude: 
“Such businesses [that produce a good or service designed to further develop-
ment] are fundamentally different from Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives” (Simon and Barmeier 2011, 2). 
3.1 Constructing the Market Infrastructure of Impact Investing 
Having engaged in boundary building to distinguish Impact Investing from 
other fields of Social Finance, the Rockefeller Foundation acted as a market 
maker by putting significant resources into the growth of Impact Investing. The 
Rockefeller Foundation sought to develop the field of Impact Investing by 
drawing in “mainstream” or “traditional” investors. At the time, the majority of 
established investors in Impact Investing in the United States were charitable 
foundations (Monitor Institute 2009; J.P. Morgan 2010): the goal was to “ex-
pand the community of Impact Investors” to incorporate mainstream investors 
in order for Impact Investing “to move from niche to mainstream” (Palandjian 
2010, 2).  
In 2007, the Rockefeller Foundation created the Rockefeller Impact Invest-
ing Collaborative (RIIC) whose members committed $38 million in 2008 to 
study how mainstream investors could be attracted to the new field (Monitor 
Institute 2009; Lane 2015). Three challenges were recognized as central to that 
task, one of which consisted of the lack of an “enabling infrastructure” to assist 
conventional investors. In this last concern, the issue of what counted as of 
value in the market, how the impact of investments could be evaluated by in-
vestors, and by what types of judgment devices were considered by the report’s 
authors to be a central problem that had to be resolved if the industry was to 
grow into a mature market (J.P. Morgan 2010; Bugg-Levine and Emerson 
2011). Impact investors would need to be able to gauge the value of an invest-
ment according to its impact (Monitor Institute 2009).  
From the perspective of the market makers for Impact Investing, this prob-
lem of uncertainty could be eliminated with the construction of a valuation 
infrastructure, composed of a reporting standard of impact (what would be-
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come the Impact Report Investing Standards) and a rating system (what would 
become the Global Impact Investing Ratings System) that assessed investees’ 
impact (Bouri 2011; Barman 2015).2 The rating system would compare invest-
ment opportunities according to the amount of impact – social and/or environ-
mental – produced by a firm’s business model or by those of the investment 
fund’s portfolio companies (Monitor 2009; Bugg-Levine and Emerson 2011). 
The rating system was to be modeled after the established ratings systems in 
the mainstream financial industry, including Morningstar’s ratings of mutual 
funds and Moody’s credit ratings.3 A respondent outlined to me in an inter-
view: “Think Standard & Poor’s but for social and environmental impact. 
That’s what they were aiming for.” These long-standing ratings agencies pro-
vide investors with what the evaluator posits to be independent and objective 
valuations of the capacity of debtees or mutual funds to meet their fiscal re-
sponsibilities.4  
The rating system for Impact Investing was intended to serve as a similar 
judgment function for impact investors but to gauge instead the non-financial 
impact of firms and funds. A senior executive at the Rockefeller Foundation 
outlined: “The idea is for investors who don’t want to go deep into the data to 
have a service that does that on their behalf to scale this industry and allow it to 
grow” (Chang 2014). Central to the emulation of financial practices of valua-
tion was the creation of commensuration – the “comparison of different entities 
according to a single metric” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 313). In this case, 
the universal metric was intended to be the amount of impact produced by a 
firm or fund’s positive business model. Investors would learn how the impact 
of an investee compares to “generally accepted set of benchmarks for low, 
medium and high impact investments” (Krogh 2009, 17). 
3.2 Evaluators and the Construction of a Rating System 
The Rockefeller Impact Investing Collaborative in 2007 hired the B Lab – a 
nonprofit committed to the adoption of CSR practices by American companies 
– to modify its own existing judgment device, the B Impact Ratings System, to 
create a new rating system of firms and funds for Impact Investing (Olsen and 
 
2  In addition, the Rockefeller Foundation also commissioned the construction of a standards 
system called IRIS (Impact Reporting and Investing Standards), for firms and investment 
funds to report on their impact (Barman 2015).  
3  This tendency to employ the forms of analysis and calculation of finance to other spaces is 
increasingly prevalent, particularly in the space of Social Finance (Chiapello 2015; Barman 
2016). 
4  Moody’s Investor Services, as with Standard & Poor’s, assigns a credit rating tier (ranging 
from AAA to C) to a corporate or government bond based on the likelihood of the bond is-
suer meeting its financial commitments. In contrast, Morningstar rates mutual funds from 
one to five stars, based on an estimation of the fund's risk-adjusted return, relative to simi-
lar funds.  
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Galimidi 2008a, 2008b). Yet, this common project did not unfold as intended, 
due to the role of the B Lab as an independent evaluator replete with its own 
biography and interests. Through discursive work and/or the creation of calcu-
lative tools (such as ratings and rankings), these “third parties” (Espeland and 
Sauder 2007) work to define and to assign value to entities in a market and to 
develop market devices which then “stabilize” that order of worth. Yet, as 
scholarship has demonstrated, any evaluator does not simply make material 
existing understandings of value but also actively constitutes it through its 
actions as an independent market intermediary (Bessy and Chauvin 2013).  
Begun in 2006 as a nonprofit by three business executives, B Lab’s stated 
mission was to encourage businesses “to be a force for good” by legitimizing 
their pursuit of corporate social responsibility in the American marketplace 
(André 2012, 133). B Lab drew from the logic of CSR by emphasizing that 
firms should be accountable to stakeholders in their business operations, their 
governance/leadership practices, and their treatment of stakeholders and the 
environment.  The founders of B Lab had identified multiple challenges to the 
diffusion of Corporate Social Responsibility in the US private sector. First, B 
Lab posited that some companies that would like to implement CSR practices 
felt compelled by their legal obligation to only maximize shareholder return. B 
Lab’s solution was the creation and dissemination of a new legal category of 
the “Benefit Corporation”: a novel type of firm that – if authorized at the state 
level – would be legally permitted to produce both profit and positive impact 
for stakeholders. Secondly, and more saliently, B Lab believed that resource 
providers to businesses, including consumers and investors, were unable to 
determine if firms were socially and environmentally beneficial because they 
had no objective standard for judgment (Marquis, Klaber, and Thomason 
2010).  
To address this problem, the B Lab created the B Impact Rating System: a 
judgment device that would evaluate the entirety of the firms’ business opera-
tions and label it as a “B Corps” if it possessed a sufficient number of CSR 
practices and policies (Lawrence 2009). First disseminated in 2007, the B Im-
pact Ratings System consisted of a free online assessment of a company’s CSR 
performance. A firm could earn the majority of its potential points based on its 
leadership (whether the company integrated a social and environmental com-
mitment into its mission, had board accountability, engaged in transparency of 
reporting, and possessed a supplier and/or Fair Trade code of conduct) and the 
effect of its operations on stakeholders. For the environment, the B rating sys-
tem asked if the company had policies in place to measure, communicate, and 
reduce its environmental impact. For employees, a firm was evaluated based on 
its provision of appropriate compensation and benefits, allowed employee 
ownership, and offered a safe work environment. For the community, data was 
collected on a company’s treatment of the local community, the breadth of its 
ownership, and its engagement in philanthropy. For consumers, B Lab evaluat-
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  41 
ed a business’s production of beneficial services, beneficial mode of communi-
ty.  
Figure 1: Example of Sample B Report (2008) 
Source: B Lab 2008. 
 
In addition, a company could earn additional points based on whether it dis-
tributed profits to stakeholders and by whether it sold beneficial products (B 
Lab 2009). To be certified as a B Corps, a company needed to earn a cumula-
tive score of at least 80 out of 200 points and pay an annual licensing fee to B 
Lab (Lawrence 2009). The B Lab then prepared a B Report on the business, an 
early 2008 version of which is shown in Figure 1, which listed the total score 
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obtained by the company as well as its constituent scores in the main CSR 
impact areas of employees, consumers, the environment, and leadership (B Lab 
2008). By 2009, the B Lab had certified 350 B Corps with $1.1 billion in reve-
nue (B Lab 2009). 
3.3  GIITS as an Impact Rating System 
Intent on commissioning a rating system to gauge the impact of investments, 
the Rockefeller Impact Investing Collaborative hired the B Lab to create a new 
rating system designed for use in Impact Investing. It began with a $500,000 
grant to B Lab that was followed by an additional $6 million over the next 
several years (GIIRS 2010b). Yet, while paid to create a rating system for 
impact investing, B Lab moved forward with a CSR conception of impact and 
with its organizational goals in mind, so constituting an example of cooperation 
without consensus, as typically occurs with a boundary object (Star and 
Griesemer 1989). The B Lab already had realized that it could foster the growth 
of B Corporations by not just working with consumers but also by facilitating 
CSR-based investment (B Lab 2009; Marquis et al. 2010). As a result, B Lab 
saw the offer to generate a rating system for Impact Investing as a sponsored 
opportunity to generate an “investor-facing” version of its own rating system 
for its own use, rather than viewing it as a stand-alone judgment device for the 
nascent market of Impact Investing (Krogh 2009): GIIRS was to be used “to 
both certify companies as B Corporations and issue GIIRS ratings” (GIIRS 
2011a, 4).  
To meet that dual goal, B Lab engaged in multiple meetings with various 
proponents of and participants in Impact Investing. It created a B-Lab non-
profit subsidiary (called GIIRS) to develop the intended judgment device as 
well as sponsoring the formation of Standards Advisory Boards for developing 
and developed markets. GIIRS beta-tested the proposed rating system with 
“pioneer funds” and “pioneer firms” who were already committed to the prin-
ciple of Impact Investing. Finally, in 2011, the new rating system, called the 
Global Impact Investment Rating System, was announced by B Lab and by the 
Global Impact Investing Network at a meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative 
(GIIRS 2011b).  
At first glance, B Lab seemingly succeeded in delivering the type of rating 
system initially envisioned by the proponents of Impact Investing. Drawing 
from a firm or investment fund’s answers to an online survey of its policies and 
practices, GIIRS gave a rating of one to five stars based on the amount of “im-
pact” generated by the firm or fund. In so doing, and as intended by the market 
makers for Impact Investing, GIIRS mirrored existing judgment devices in the 
mainstream financial industry, such as Morningstar’s ratings of mutual funds 
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and Moody’s credit ratings, by generating the commensuration of potential 
investments for impact investors (GIIRS 2010a, 2011a).5 
Yet, as a result of the particular biography of this judgment device – one re-
plete with “traces of multiple viewpoints, translations and incomplete battles” 
(Star and Griesemer 1989, 413), the newly unveiled rating system did not align 
in important ways with the conception of impact intended to distinguish Impact 
Investing from other participants in the space of Social Finance. To be sure, the 
new rating system did gather data on the presence of a positive business model. 
However, both in its methodology and its reporting of a firm’s impact rating, 
the new rating system incorporated and communicated a CSR conception of 
impact, so maintaining important similarities to B Lab’s original B Rating 
System. 
Methodologically, GIIRS required a firm or investment fund to answer 
online questions about the generation of two different types of impact – its 
business operations and its business model. First, reflecting B Lab’s own con-
ception of impact as generated from a firm’s business operations, GIIRS re-
quired a firm or investment fund to provide information about its (or its inves-
tees’) CSR performance – its practices and policies regarding leadership (what 
it also began to call accountability) and the environment, as well as its treat-
ment of workers and the community as key stakeholders (GIIRS 2011a). For 
example, in the area of workers, GIIRS (2011a) awards points to a company for 
the presence of desirable practices concerning “compensation and wages, 
worker benefits, training and education, worker ownership, job flexibil-
ity/corporate culture (developed markets only), human rights & labor policy 
(developing markets only), management and worker communication, and oc-
cupational health & safety.” 
Along with the measure of a firm’s CSR performance, GIIRS also assigned 
value to companies based on the presence of a “socially and environmentally-
focused business model” (SEM), so incorporating the discourse of Impact 
Investing.6 Here, GIIRS departed from the B Rating System, as shown in Fig-
ure 1 (B Lab 2008). As shown in Table 1, GIIRS assigns points when a compa-
ny creates impact through an intentional positive business model – the sale of a 
good or service that is “community or environmentally oriented,” in “contrast 
to good business operations” (GIIRS 2012, 5). A positive business model is 
based on a firm’s sale of “community-oriented products and services” for 
which a company receives points if its products or services are specifically 
 
5  GIIRS had other strengths as a rating system: it was an independent and objective third-
party source of transparent and verifiable data (GIIRS 2010a). 
6  In addition, the GIIRS methodology could assign points to a company if it possessed a 
business model in which supply chains benefited specific stakeholders to alleviate poverty or 
was designed to increase wealth and decision-making power of historically underserved 
stakeholders (GIIRS 2011a). 
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designed to “provide significant social benefit to consumers,” including “basic 
services, health, education, economic development, arts & media, flow of capi-
tal to purpose driven enterprises.” A company also can receive points if it pos-
sesses an environmentally-oriented business model in that its products or ser-
vices are designed to provide “significant benefit to the environment, including 
renewable energy, resource conservation, waste reduction, land or wildlife 
conservation, pollution prevention, education” (GIIRS 2011a). 
Table 1:  GIIRS’ Conversion of Socially and Environmentally-Focused Business 
Model to Corporate Social Responsibility Impact Area 
SEM Business Model CSR Impact Area 
Social Enterprise (formalized through governance structure) Governance 
Worker Ownership (e.g. cooperatives) Workers 
Community Owned Products & Services Community 
Workforce Development (chronically unemployed populations) Community 
Supply Chain (small-scale +/or Fair Trade Certified) Community 
Local (supply chains, ownership, banking, customers, +/or giving) Community 
Local Economic Development (privatization or import substitution) Community 
Producer Cooperative Community 
Charitable Giving (>20% profits) Community 
Environmental Practices Environment 
Environmentally Oriented Products or Services Environment 
Source: GIIRS 2011a. 
 
Yet, while data was collected on the company’s employment of a positive 
business model, this information was not included in the resulting GIIRS re-
port. Instead, as outlined in Table 1, GIIRS methodology instead converted the 
presence of each type of business model into the accrual of points for one of its 
CSR-based “impact areas” of governance, workers, community, or the envi-
ronment. So, for example, a company that possessed a business model that 
focused on workforce development would receive points in the relevant CSR 
impact area of the “community,” as one instance of the practice of equitable 
compensation, benefits, and training.  
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Figure 2:  Example of Sample GIIRS Report 
 
Source: GIIRS 2011a.  
 
As a result, as shown in Figure 2, because of the conversion of a business mod-
el to a CSR impact area in its calculative methodology, the GIIRS firm or fund 
report did not include a rating of the presence of a positive business model for a 
firm or fund. The GIIRS company rating report – the only information made 
public to investors by and about a firm or fund – included only the total overall 
impact rating (a point score and an allocation of one to five stars) and the 
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GIIRS rating for each of its four CSR-based impact areas: accountability (what 
it was then calling governance or leadership), community, environment, and 
employees. No separate, stand-alone rating or score was provided for a firm or 
fund’s employment of a “socially or environmentally focused” business model 
(Marquis et al. 2010; GIIRS 2011a).7  
4. Theorizing GIIRS’ Reactivity for Impact Investing 
With the construction of GIIRS, the market makers for Impact Investing 
achieved their goal of creating a valuation infrastructure to facilitate main-
stream impact investment. As was intended by its creators, GIIRS has become 
a commonly used rating tool in the field of Impact Investing, although it has by 
no means become ubiquitous. By 2016, over 6,000 companies had received a 
GIIRS impact rating (Clark 2016). Impact investors report that they frequently 
employ GIIRS as a ratings tool (although it is often used alongside or integrat-
ed with investors’ own customized methods; Best and Harji 2013; Lazarini, 
Cabal, Pongeluppe, Ferreira, and Rotondaro 2014; Reeder, Colantonio, Loder, 
and Rocyn Jones 2015). In a 2017 survey of impact investors by the Global 
Impact Investing Network, for example, GIIRS was the most employed rating 
tool used by investors in developed markets and the second most common 
judgment device for investors focused on emerging markets (after the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals; GIIN 2018b). 
Yet, while GIIRS did constitute a universal metric of impact that was creat-
ed for impact investment akin to financial rating systems, it did so by incorpo-
rating criteria taken from CSR, recognized from the start by key proponents as 
antithetical to the distinguishing characteristics of Impact Investing. It is fruit-
ful to consider the likely consequences of the widespread use of this rating 
system for the field of Impact Investing. Scholarship provides a number of 
expectations and critiques, highlighting the reactive effects of GIIRS for inves-
tors and investees, so potentially reconfiguring the identity and practices of 
Impact Investing. A pragmatist approach emphasizes the reactive role of judg-
ment devices: rating, rankings, and ratios identify, valorize, and so bring a 
particular notion of value into being (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Espeland and 
Sauder 2007). In this case, given the dual conceptions of impact captured and 
communicated by GIIRS, it might be expected that the definition of “impact” 
 
7  By 2013, likely due to the mismatch between the identity of Impact Investing and the type 
of CSR-based impact areas communicated by a GIIRS report, pressure from the “impact in-
vestor community” led the B Lab to modify its company rating report to include both a 
measure of “business operations” and a measure of the “impact business model” (B Lab 
2013). Nonetheless, as a rating system, GIIRS continues to evaluate firms and funds in part 
according to their use of CSR-based business operations. 
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that characterizes Impact Investing will expand beyond the positive effects of 
firms’ business models to also incorporate the effects of their business opera-
tions for stakeholders and the environment. This shift should be evident not 
only in the discourse of the field but in the criteria used by investors to select 
impact investments (Dadush 2012). Given that impact investors draw from 
GIIRS to compare investment options, then they should direct their financial 
resources towards firms and funds that are rated highly by GIIRS – those that 
not only create impact through their positive business model but also those that 
design their business operations around CSR principles. Further, the wide-
spread use of GIIRS will likely generate reactive behavior among impact inves-
tees. Firms or funds can be expected to focus resources on the optimal organi-
zation of their business operations in order to improve their GIIRS score, 
potentially at the expense of most effectively and efficiently delivering a so-
cially or environmentally beneficial product for their target customer. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the field of Impact Investing as a case of Social Finance 
where financial activity is promoted as a means to pursue firms’ generation of 
economic return and the production of impact through their business models. 
The growth of this new market required not just market makers’ discursive 
specification of the precise type of impact produced by this type of financial 
activity, as compared to other Social Finance spaces, as an instance of bounda-
ry-building work, but also those actors commissioning of an evaluator to create 
a socio-material infrastructure that facilitated engagement by investors and 
transformed potential investees (local firms or funds) into objects of financial 
speculation. The realization of the market of Impact Investing was deemed 
contingent upon the creation of a judgment device that resolved the issue of 
quality uncertainty concerning the measure of the non-financial impact of an 
investment for investors.  
Drawing from an in-depth, qualitative case study, I accounted for the con-
struction of a rating system for Impact Investing. By outlining the biography of 
GIIRS as a material object (Kopytoff 1988), I detailed how the judgment de-
vice’s classification system and methodology – what was captured and com-
municated as impact by the rating system – followed from advocates’ goal of 
creating a universal metric that resolved quality uncertainty for mainstream 
investors of the non-financial impact of an investment, modeled after rating 
systems in the financial market, such as the credit ratings of Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s.  
Yet, the goal of creating commensurability via mimicry was complicated by 
the multivocal nature of impact as a boundary object in Social Finance. Im-
portantly, a boundary object is characterized both by flexible interpretation on 
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the part of different actors and by groups with differing interests cooperating 
around a common task (Star 2010). Thus, the use of the concept of boundary 
object entails attention to both cultural and relational conditions. On the one 
hand, impact as a distinguishing component of Social Finance was (and re-
mains) characterized by consensus when viewed from a bird’s eye view – it 
signifies the non-financial benefit that is posited to be achievable, alongside 
financial return, by socially or environmentally-oriented action in the market. 
On the other hand, actors in the constituent spaces that comprise Social Finance 
have espoused distinct notions of precisely how companies can achieve impact 
and for whom. These differences in the definition of impact at the granular 
level, however, only became salient for the market of Impact Investing in a 
specific relational context; in this case when the market maker/s for Impact 
Investing commissioned an independent evaluator with a biography and inter-
est in promoting Corporate Social Responsibility to create the desired rating 
system. This shared project, while characterized by consensus of purpose, 
nonetheless resulted in a discrepancy between the conception of impact that 
distinguished the market of Impact Investing and the conception of impact that 
was captured and communicated by the resulting rating system, with likely 
reactive effects for impact investors and investees.  
The findings of this study have broader implications for the study of con-
cerned markets and, more specifically, for the case of Social Finance. Scholar-
ship on concerned markets – spaces that bring together manifold and plural 
modes of value – must attend not only to how actors innovatively create a new 
hybrid quality convention but also to whether and how judgment devices are 
brought into being that coordinate market members around the new order of 
worth and that evaluate market objects according to that new criteria. The case 
of Impact Investing suggests such processes are not straightforward but instead 
complicated by the diverging imaginings and interests of those actors involved 
in generating a valuation infrastructure for a new concerned market. In so do-
ing, the article affirms a pragmatist approach to value which examines the 
biography of the constituent mechanisms, devices, and rules that assign and so 
perform value (Muniesa 2012). This process is further complicated for Social 
Finance, given the ambiguous and variegated nature of impact across its con-
stituent fields. Thus, a full account of the conditions for a market of Social 
Finance to succeed must attend to both the cultural and relational factors that 
shape its valuation infrastructure. As other markets of Social Finance emerge, 
and as new judgement devices in the form of additional ratings, ratios, and 
rankings are created in existing and new fields to capture and communicate 
impact, scholars would be wise to attend to how and via what causal pathways 
such calculative tools come about and how they define or re-define the seem-
ingly already established categories and classifications of impact for each nas-
cent arena of Social Finance.  
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